

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 IO-13 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-07 NRC-05 OES-07 FEAE-00
DODE-00 ERDA-05 SS-15 SP-02 PM-04 /096 W
-----101915Z 023561 /50

R 101840Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0211
INFO ALL EC CAPITALS
ERDA WASHDC
ERDA GERMANTOWN
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 05965

USEEC

VIENNA FOR IAEA: PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: EEC, PARM, TECH, IAEA
SUBJ: EURATOM/IAEA VERIFICATION AGREEMENT

REF: A.STATE 124488, B.BRUSSELS 5614

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON STATUS OF EC EFFORTS TO
COMPLETE SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER SUBJECT AGREEMENT
WAS OBTAINED BY USEC OFFICERS AT A MEETING WITH MOEHLER,
CHEF DE CABINET FOR COMMISSIONER BRUNNER, SCHLEICHER,
DIRECTOR, EURATOM SAFEGUARDS, AND OTHER EC OFFICIALS ON
JUNE 8.

2. THE COMMISSION HAS PROPOSED A CONCEPT THAT THEY
BELIEVE WOULD GIVE IAEA INSPECTORS THE NECESSARY DIRECT
INVOLVEMENT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MINIMIZING DUPLICATION
OF EFFORT. THE CONCEPT REFERRED TO EARLIER BY COMMISSION-
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ER BRUNNER (REFTEL B), INVOLVES THE USE OF JOINT (OR
"MIXED") INSPECTION TEAMS FOR THOSE FACILITIES WHERE MORE
THAN ONE EURATOM INSPECTOR IS NECESSARY TO CONDUCT INSPEC-
TIONS (I.E., AT "SENSITIVE" FACILITIES SUCH AS REPROCESS-
ING PLANTS, ENRICHMENT FACILITIES, AND FUEL FABRICATION
FACILITIES). THE INSPECTION TEAM, UNDER THIS CONCEPT,
WOULD BE COMPOSED OF BOTH EURATOM AND IAEA INSPECTORS

WORKING INTIMATELY TOGETHER ON THE COMMON INSPECTION ACTIVITY. BY THIS MEANS, THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AT A SITE DURING AN INSPECTION COULD BE EFFECTIVELY REDUCED IN HALF (COMPARED TO ONE-FOR-ONE DUPLICATION BY IAEA OF THE EURATOM INSPECTION FORCE). THE PROPOSAL WAS INTRODUCED WITH COREPER ON JUNE 2 BUT NOT DISCUSSED. MOEHLER WAS CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE FAVORABLY RECEIVED SINCE CONFIDENTIAL

THERE HAD BEEN MEMBER STATE OPPOSITION TO THIS CONCEPT WHEN IT WAS RAISED FIVE YEARS AGO AS ONE POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EURATOM/IAEA VERIFICATION AGREEMENT THEN UNDER NEGOTIATION. IT WAS DISCUSSED AGAIN BRIEFLY IN COREPER LATE JUNE 9, BUT APPARENTLY INCONCLUSIVELY.

3. SCHLEICHER REPORTED THAT STEADY PROGRESS IS BEING MADE ON THE UNCONTROVERSIAL PARTS OF COMPLETING THE FACILITY ATTACHMENTS, MAINLY THROUGH FREQUENT MEETINGS OF THE "STANDING CONTACT GROUP." THE PRINCIPAL IMPASSE IS STILL THE QUESTION OF THE DEGREE OF INDEPENDENT INSPECTION THE IAEA MUST DO VERSUS HOW MUCH, IF ANY, OF THE UNACCOMPANIED INSPECTION FINDINGS OF EURATOM THE IAEA INSPECTORS CAN ACCEPT. SCHLEICHER SAID THAT HE SEES THE IAEA ATTITUDE AS BEING UNWILLING TO ACCEPT ANY INSPECTION RESULTS UNLESS IAEA WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED. THIS, HE SAYS, WOULD RENDER THE EURATOM SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM USELESS AND SUPERFLUOUS. HE ARGUES THAT THE 1973 AGREEMENT CLEARLY PROVIDED FOR SOMETHING LESS THAN TOTAL DUPLICATION OF EURATOM INSPECTION EFFORT.

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4. MISSION OFFICERS GAVE EC OFFICIALS AN UNOFFICIAL COPY OF THE SUBPARAGRAPHS OF PARAGRAPH 2 REFTEL A (CONVEYED BY AMBASSADOR TO BRUNNER ON JUNE 2, REFTEL B). EC OFFICIALS RECOGNIZE THAT U.S. POSITION IS THE SAME AS THEY HAVE BEEN HEARING FROM VIENNA. THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUES APPEARED TO BE (1) THE U.S. POSITION THAT IAEA CANNOT ACCEPT ANY EURATOM INSPECTION ACTIVITY WITHOUT INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION WHICH THE EC OFFICIALS STATE IS CONTRARY TO THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE LETTER AND INTENT OF THE 1973 AGREEMENT, AND (2) THE APPARENT U.S. REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONCEPT THAT IAEA INSPECTION WITHIN EURATOM IS TO BE WITH A LARGER MESH SCREEN THAN THAT USED BY THE EURATOM SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. THEY READ OUR TEXT AS REQUIRING THAT IAEA EMPLOY THE SAME AMOUNT OF INSPECTION EFFORT IN EC COUNTRIES AS THEY DO IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY. THIS, THEY FEEL, IS A NEW POSITION BY THE U.S.

5. THERE WAS SOME CONCERN OVER OUR PHRASE, "EITHER ALONE

OR TOGETHER WITH EURATOM INSPECTORS," IN PARA 2.C., REFTEL
A. THEY POINTED OUT THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT ALLOW IAEA
INSPECTORS TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS WITHOUT BEING ACCOMPANIED
BY EURATOM PERSONNEL. EC OFFICIALS ALSO NOTED THAT THE
EURATOM/IAEA AGREEMENT CALLS FOR MORE THAN JUST A "SYSTEM
OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL." THEY
SAY THAT THIS PORTION OF THEIR AGREEMENT WAS PURPOSELY
WORDED AS A "SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS," THUS RECOGNIZING THE
UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EURATOM SYSTEM COMPARED TO THAT
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OF A STATE OR GROUP OF STATES.

6. MOEHLER NOTED THAT FRG AND BELGIUM HAVE NOT YET
COMPLETED THE LEGISLATIVE MEASURES NEEDED TO BRING THE
AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. HE SAID THAT THE US POSITION, IF
MADE KNOWN TO OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE RESPECTIVE
PARLIAMENTS, WOULD PROVIDE STRONG AMMUNITION FOR DEFEATING,
DELAYING, OR REVISING THE ENACTMENT OF THESE MEASURES IN
THOSE COUNTRIES.

7. MOEHLER WAS UNABLE TO PREDICT WHAT THE NEXT STEP
MIGHT BE SINCE IT DEPENDED ON RESULTS OF COREPER
CONSIDERATION. IT ALSO IS NOT YET DECIDED AT WHAT MANAGE-
MENT LEVEL THE NEXT DISCUSSIONS WITH IAEA WILL BE HELD
PENDING HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DECISIONS ON THE REMAINING
PROBLEMS. COMMISSION OFFICIALS SPOKE IN TERMS OF HAVING

A SENIOR COMMISSION OFFICIAL GO TO VIENNA FOR FURTHER
EXPLORATORY TALKS ON POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS.

8. THE FLAVOR OF EURATOM STAFF REACTION TO OUR DEMARCHE
IS PERHAPS WELL ILLUSTRATED BY THE QUESTION MICHEL
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AMORY, IN CHARGE OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS IN NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY IN DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR SCIENCE AND RESEARCH,
ASKED THE AMBASSADOR JUNE 9. "DOES THE UNITED STATES WANT
EURATOM TO RENEGOTIATE ITS BASIC AGREEMENT WITH IAEA?"
THE ANSWER WAS "NO, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR EURATOM TO
GO THE EXTRA MILE IN IMPLEMENTING THAT AGREEMENT."HINTON

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